

Chase

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-282
29 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

FROM : [REDACTED]
Chairman

SUBJECT : Community Security Needs and Problems [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] As I leave the chairmanship of the DCI Security Committee, I would like to share some of my thoughts and conclusions on Intelligence Community security needs and problems. The needs as I see them focus on organization, management, and resources dedicated to Community security matters.

2. [REDACTED] Some particularly significant problems that I see needing effective resolution are:

a. [REDACTED] Personnel Security Standards. By any reasonable test, persons throughout the government (and industry) should meet essentially the same standards for access to intelligence information at the same level of classification. The standards, however, vary widely. CIA has very stringent ones for its employees. Yet, CIA-generated intelligence is disseminated widely to Defense, State, and other agencies using lesser standards. Defense, for example,

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[REDACTED] These varying standards are based on different concepts of what is a necessary and proper basis for granting clearances. A Security Committee working group is conducting a study to try to determine what is necessary and desirable in personnel security. The results, while primarily applicable to a possible revision of DCID 1/14, should give us a good basis for proposing better standards throughout the government for access to Secret and Top Secret information. But, that is easier said than

SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

done. A fairly well-solidified body of opinion more concerned with privacy considerations and due process than with good security coalesced in recent years behind the proposed revision of E.O. 10450, which sets personnel security standards for Government employees generally. I do not believe the Intelligence Community will be able to make its views prevail in this arena unless it can speak with a single voice on the subject and be supported at the policy level.

25X1 b. [] Computer Security. I am quite concerned about the security of intelligence information, particularly that which is compartmented, in shared ADP systems accessible by persons with varying levels of security clearances. The multi-level mode of operation of such systems relies too much in my judgment on everything working exactly as it should. Computer software cannot give positive assurances that boundaries between different classification and control levels of stored/processed data cannot be violated. The wide variance in personnel security standards noted above suggests the possibility of, for example, someone in Defense cleared by a process


25X1 [] obtaining access through a remote terminal to very sensitive CIA data stored in the system. Business experience with fraud and embezzlement through ADP systems suggests that the perpetrators are caught more by accident than by effective security precautions built into the equipment and its software. I believe there needs to be a greater concentration of Community effort in this area, and a single Community focal point to identify specific problems and devise coordinated policy to correct them.

25X1 c. [] Compartmentation. The Intelligence Community's special security control systems are conspicuous for their lack of central management and common standards. The perception of abuse in this area (whether or not well founded) has prompted pleas for change from many Community agencies. But, we are just now beginning to take tentative steps towards some sort of standardized procedures. A basic problem is that there are too many Community components involved in the subject. Another fundamental problem, and the one that may well cause the most suspicion on the part of consumers, is that the collectors who argue the need for compartments to begin with are also the ones who write the implementation rules, with their programs and procedures subject effectually only to review by themselves. Current approaches to the subject favor those with a vested interest in the status quo. Arguments are often made for the continuation of a system not so much because it is currently justified, but because of history. The COMINT compartment, for example, is very much in need of thorough review and revision to bring it into line with 1977 circumstances.

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SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

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3. [redacted] I believe the Security Committee as a staff support element for the DCI is the logical focal point for the Community in all security matters. Its responsibility for such should be made explicit through charter revision, which should simultaneously see that the charters of collection committees are changed to state that their security responsibilities are advisory to the Security Committee. These changes would have to be accompanied by resource reallocations to give the Security Committee enough manpower to enable it to support the DCI's security responsibilities effectively. Current manpower authorizations essentially limit us to a collegial role, relying on Community agencies to provide personnel on an additional duty basis to chair functional subcommittees and working groups, and sometimes restricting us to the painfully slow evolution of a Community consensus before a policy can be developed or revised. With adequate manpower, we can serve as a meaningful support component for the DCI and the Community. This would involve a capability: (1) to chair with our own people the requisite subcommittees (compartmentation, computer security, etc.) and working groups (e.g., personnel security standards) and thereby control timetables and agenda; (2) to monitor compliance with DCI security directives throughout the Community; and (3) to assist Community agencies in the implementation of security policy. I believe that failure to establish and properly staff a Community focal point for security could result in outside entities seeking to fill the vacuum. Community acceptance of and cooperation with any coordinating security body will be strongly influenced by the perception of independence of such body from any single Community agency.

SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

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4. ☐ The above comments notwithstanding, the Security Committee has made some significant accomplishments. However, much remains to be done.



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SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

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